Tag Archives: Talmud

“While most Amoraim were familiar with the mishnayot of the sedarim…such familiarity was not universal”

While most Amoraim were familiar with the mishnayot of the sedarim which formed the curriculum of Amoraim study, such familiarity was not universal. … Even when a relevant mishnah is cited, it is not always verbatim. …

The difference between the Bavli’s citation of mishnayot and those of Toseftan baraitot is that the text of the Mishnah has been transmitted along with that of the Bavli from the earliest times.

Yaakov Elman, Authority and Tradition: Toseftan Baraitot in Talmudic Babylonian (New York: The Michael Scharf Publication Trust of the Yeshiva University Press; Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 1994), 48.

Ruth Calderon on Encountering Talmud and Becoming Enamored with it

…I contained — a void. I did not know how to fill that void, but when I first encountered the Talmud and became completely enamored with it — its language, its humor, its profound thinking, its modes of discussion, and the practicality, humanity and maturity that emerge from its lines — I sensed that I had found the love of my life, what I had been lacking.

Ruth Calderon, “‘The Time Has Come To Re-appropriate What Is Ours’”, Israel Now: A Special Supplement to the Jewish Week, trans. Elli Fischer (31 May 2013), 13.

What Edgar Bronfman loved in the Babylonian Talmud

A devout non-believer, Edgar said his favorite book was the Babylonian Talmud, whose hero is not God but the argumentative and cunning human scholar. The paradigm of the Talmudic scholar requires a rigorous knowledge of foundational texts and a sharp wit, mixed with a healthy dose of competitiveness, a thirst for justice, an appreciation of one’s own fallibility… and a great sense of humor.

Rabbi Mishael Zion and Rebecca Voorwinde, “Edgar M. Bronfman: A Modern Talmudic Jew”, The Jewish Week (10 January 2014), 29.

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We should expect that each Amora has his own individual understanding of various issues

In a statement repeated several times in Shas, Rava emphasizes the importance of an individual’s input in Torah study, that is, the process of making Torah one’s own. Let us look at AZ 19a, where this appears in the context of Rava’s ‘musar shmuess’ regarding Talmud Torah. … In other words, our task in studying Torah, if we merit it, is to put our own individual stamp on Hashem’s Torah by filtering it through our own understanding, as limited as that may be. The souls of Kelal Yisrael were all at Mattan Torah, and we each have our own portion of Torah assigned to us. Of course, that understanding, even if part of our ‘self’ contributes to it, must reflect true Torah values and modes of thought and argument. Clearly, this individual stamp on Torah learning applies to the Amoraim; after all, Rava was first and foremost addressing his own colleagues, who were Amoraim. Thus, we should expect that each Amora has his own individual understanding of various issues, and when they differ, seemingly isolated differences might be understood as expressions of a more general outlook.

Yaakov Elman, “Rava as Mara de-Atra in Mahoza”, Hakirah 11 (Spring 2011), 61-62

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The rabbis did take notice of shifts in historical reality, but only when…

…the rabbis did take notice of shifts in historical reality, but only when such comparisons provided some contribution toward an understanding of their own situation. The past thereby emerges as a way of defining or categorizing the present, just as discussions on the cessation of prophecy helped contribute to an understanding of the role of the sages.
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Regarding historical causality in rabbinic thought, it appears meaningful only when understood within a framework of moral virtue or culpability. Punishment following sin (for nations as well as individuals) thus becomes a form of moral causality, with the nature of the divine chastisement frequently deriving from the essence of its causes. This is not to say that the rabbis were totally oblivious to the role of history in the halakhic process. Their discussions surrounding gezerot and takkanot clearly portray an awareness of the impact of social realities in the past on the development of certain halakhic behavior. But here too history plays a subservient role, and it is the relevant legal issues that remain at the center of the rabbinic discourse.

Isaiah Gafni, “Concepts of Periodization and Causality in Talmudic Literature”, Jewish History, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring, 1996), 34.

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Jewish law is justificatory, often revealing its own raison d’être

Jewish law is justificatory, often revealing its own raison d’être, Apodictic Mishnah, on the other hand, constitutes a deviation from this overall trend of vindicatory law. It runs counter to Jewish apperception, which favors laws that justify themselves, either logically or scripturally. No wonder Mishnaic form was relatively short-lived, lasting only about 130 years. Mishnaic form initially emerged as a response to the particular political and religious conditions that prevailed in Palestine during the period following the destruction of the Temple. During the second century, it was supported and upheld by the Patriarchate, particularly by R. Judah Hanassi. After his death (ca. 220-221), Mishnaic form was gradually abandoned, and the Jewish apperception for justificatory law prevailed.

David Weiss Halivni, Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara: The Jewish Predilection for Justified Law (Cambridge, MA & London, UK: Harvard University Press, 1986), 4.

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The redactors of the Talmud were more than editors; they were partners in creation

The…redactors of the Talmud…were more than editors – that is, they did not just correct and arrange contents and style in conformity with set standards; they were partners in creation. They provided lengthy explanatory notes, completed defective statements, and supplemented the text with passages of their own. Above all, they initiated a new (rather, old and new) awareness that the discursive, too, deserves to be preserved, that how one arrives at a conclusion has importance beyond the pedagogic lesson of knowing how to arrive at new conclusions in the future. Disputation is an activity of the human mind and, as such, deserves to be known, studied, and explored. The redactors became masters of this genre of learning and influenced subsequent rabbinic learning up to this day.

David Weiss Halivni, Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara: The Jewish Predilection for Justified Law (Cambridge, MA & London, UK: Harvard University Press, 1986), 3.

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The overwhelming majority of redactional changes occurred in the discursive passages of the Talmud

…the overwhelming majority of redactional changes occurred in the discursive passages of the Talmud, the ones that contain arguments and discussions, rather than in the apodictic passages, the ones that contain fixed law. Apodictic passages apparently needed no improvement; they were not defective. Such a substantial difference could not have taken place accidentally. There must have been a conscious decision to preserve carefully the fixed law and to neglect benignly the argumentational material. After a conclusion was reached, the means of arriving at it, the arguments that went into making it, seemed no longer important. This should not surprise us; it is exactly the way the authors of the Mishnah and the Braitha (ca. 50-200 C.E.) practiced transmission.

David Weiss Halivni, Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara: The Jewish Predilection for Justified Law (Cambridge, MA & London, UK: Harvard University Press, 1986), 2.

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Texts become defective if they are not carefully preserved

…texts, and oral texts in particular, become defective only if they are not carefully preserved, if they are not faithfully and reliably transmitted. In this case, we would have to assume that during the Talmudic period, certain texts (those that required redactional changes) composed by some of the great sages were transmitted haphazardly, in an incomplete and defective state. Some texts eventually may even have disappeared altogether: neglecting to preserve texts properly leads not only to defectiveness, but also to disappearance,

David Weiss Halivni, Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara: The Jewish Predilection for Justified Law (Cambridge, MA & London, UK: Harvard University Press, 1986), 2.

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The differences between takkanot and gezerot

The institutional nature of the Halakhah found its expression int he terms which are used to refer to it in the earliest sources at our disposal. The halakhot from the period of the Pairs (Zugot) and the early tanna’im are referred to as gezerot and takkanot. The only difference between them is that the latter were regulations intended to correct a situation in a positive manner whereas the gezerah is prohibitive and restrictive. The gezerah is identical to the seyag (fence) in the aphorism attributed to the Men of the Great Assembly, “Make a seyag around the Torah.” There is nothing new in a gezerah, it just places a protective fence, so to speak, around a Torah commandment in order to “keep people from transgressing it” (Berakhot 1:1).
The takkanah, on the other hand, initiates something new and thus it corrects an aberration which has developed.

Ephraim E. Urbach, The Halakhah: Its Sources and Development, trans. Raphael Posner (Ramat Gan: Massada; Jerusalem: Yad la-Talmud, 1986), 7.